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COMMON LAW REMEDIES OF EMPLOYEES INJURED BY
EMPLOYER USE OF POLYGRAPH TESTING
Deborah Weimer*
I. INTRODUCTION
Defamation and invasion of privacy occur routinely during the
administration of polygraph examinations in the workplace. Previ-
ously, employers have been shielded from liability for defamation
on the grounds that publications in this context are protected by a
qualified privilege. Until recently, the general perception was that
employees had no substantial expectation of privacy in the
workplace.
However, times change. Evidence is available to persuade courts
that the value of the polygraph to employers is far outweighed by
the damage it may do and has done to innocent employees. Courts
are less willing to conclude that employees lose all rights to be free
from tortious injury when they accept employment on an "at will"
basis.
The unreliability of polygraphs and the potential for their abu-
sive use in the employment setting are increasingly being recog-
nized by legislatures and the courts. Twenty-one states have en-
acted legislation prohibiting or strictly limiting the use of
polygraphs in private employment. Absent a protective statute,
employees may find common law protections available. This article
explores the remedies available to employees who are injured by
employer use of polygraphs, focusing particularly on those jurisdic-
tions which have not enacted protective legislation.
Part I of this article briefly describes the polygraph mechanism
itself, and the serious weaknesses of this "lie detection" technique.
Section II focuses on the remedies available to employees who have
been discharged for failing or refusing to take a polygraph test.
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II. THE POLYGRAPH
A. The Technique of Polygraphy
David Nagle, writing in support of the widespread use of
polygraphs by employers, suggests that historical precedents of the
polygraph give the polygraph more legitimacy.' He described the
Arabic practice of putting a hot iron on the dry tongue of one ac-
cused of deceit. If his tongue burned, this would prove his guilt.
The theory was that the accused's fear of being revealed as the
guilty party would lead to a reduced production of saliva, and his
tongue would burn as a result. India employed a similar, though
less painful, test involving the chewing of dry rice. If the suspect
could not spit out the rice, this established guilt. Nagle indicated
that these tests are "frequently seen as the conceptual forerunners
of the polygraph in that they depended upon the subject's faith in
the procedure, his fear of detection, and his resulting physiological
reactions."2
The techniques on which the modern polygraph are based are
straightforward. The polygraph is designed to detect changes in
blood pressure, breathing pattern and skin moisture. Measures of
skin moisture are also referred to as galvanic skin response, elec-
trodermal response, or skin conductance response. Changes in any
of these functions are monitored. A sphygmograph, similar to the
device used to take blood pressure, is a part of the machine.
Pneumographic tubes are placed around the subject's chest and
abdomen to measure changes in her breathing pattern. Electrodes
are attached to two fingers on the right hand to measure perspira-
tion. Each of these functions is measured and reflected on a poly-
graph chart where a pen driven by an attachment records any
changes. s
Contrary to the impression that may be given by the term "lie
detector," bells do not go off when the subject "tells a lie." Rather,
the polygraph operator must interpret the chart and arrive at some
conclusion regarding the subject's truthfulness.
The theory underlying the polygraph is that changes in the sub-
ject's vital signs indicate deception. The original belief was that
1. Nagle, The Polygraph in the Workplace, 18 U. RICH. L. REv. 43 (1983).
2. Id. at 44-45.
3. For a thorough explanation of the technique, see J. REID & F. INBAU, TRUTH AND DECEP-
TION: THE POLYGRAPH ("LIE DETECTOR") TECHNIQUE (1977).
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the effort required to lie, as opposed to telling the truth, caused a
change in the subject's vital functions.4 The current theory, how-
ever, is that fear of being detected in a lie affects the bodily func-
tions in a way that can be recorded on a graph.
A polygraph examination begins with the pre-test interview in
which the examiner goes over the questions to be asked with the
subject. The purpose of this interview is to put the "innocent" per-
son at ease while heightening the tension for the "guilty"
individual.'
The questions used by the examiner in the employment context
in seeking information about a specific incident or problem follow
a general pattern. The examiner will use a series of "relevant" and
"irrelevant" questions. For example, a relevant question in a situa-
tion where an employer is concerned about an inventory shortage
might be: "Have you ever taken anything from your employer
without paying for it?" Irrelevant questions, such as "Did you eat
breakfast this morning?" are used as a basis for comparison.
One obvious difficulty with this system is that it is more likely
that a person, whether he is innocent or guilty, will react to being
asked an accusatory question-"Did you take money from the cash
register for your own personal use?" than to an innocuous ques-
tion-"Do you drink coffee?" As a result, "control" questions have
been brought in to respond to this problem. In addition to relevant
and irrelevant questions, the subject is asked a general question
that is remotely related to the issues at hand. For example, a con-
trol question might be, "Have you ever betrayed someone who
trusted you?" In theory, the innocent person will be more con-
cerned with the control question than with the relevant question.
The guilty subject will show concern about the control question,
but will have a more dramatic response to the relevant question.7
The test is repeated at least twice. After the test has been com-
4. Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013, 1014 (D.C. Cir. 1923).
5. Nagle, supra note 1, at 46.
6. Polygraphs and Employment, A BNA Special Report, Gov't Empl. Rel. Rep. (BNA) 3,
3-4 (Sept. 16, 1985).
7. The usefulness of control questions in the pre-employment screening context has been
questioned by the Office of Technology Assessment. "It is not clear, however, how the Reid
pre-employment control questions differ from the relevant questions .... It is also not
clear why employers would be less concerned with the control than with the relevant ques-
tions." Id. at 5 (quoting OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT, U.S. CONGRESS, SCIENTIFIC VA-
LIDITY OF POLYGRAPH TESTING 18 (1983)) [hereinafter OTA].
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pleted, the examiner reviews and scores the charts and arrives at
an opinion with regard to the subject's truthfulness. If he believes
the subject was deceptive, he will attempt to elicit a confession.'
B. Problems with the Polygraph
If properly administered, the polygraph is capable of measuring
changes in the vital functions. However, at best a polygraph chart
can only indicate that a subject was more aroused by one question
than by another; it is impossible to determine from the chart why
the subject was more disturbed by one question than another.9
This is the primary shortcoming of this technique, and many crit-
ics see it as a fatal one. 10
An individual may experience internal turmoil for a variety of
reasons other than guilt when asked a particular question on a pol-
ygraph test. He may be upset or angry at being falsely accused of a
crime. He may be anxious about having to defend himself against
an unfounded accusation. He may be worried about being asked
about some related or unrelated matter that he would rather keep
private." In short, there is no particular physiological change that
will occur only when a subject is lying. 12
Proponents of the polygraph acknowledge this serious limitation
8. The coercive power of the polygraph is well recognized. For example, William Colby, in
advocating the continued use of polygraph tests for national security purposes to the Sen-
ate, stated: "It's a miserable experience, no doubt about it .... We in CIA some years ago
reported to one of the committees of the House that we would have hired 150 people but for
the fact of what came out after they were put through the polygraph," Id. at 7.
9. Lykken, Detecting Deception in 1984, 27 AM. BEHAVIORAL SCIENTIST 481 (1984).
10. Kleinmuntz & Szucko, On the Fallibility of Lie Detection, 17 LAW & Soc'y REV. 85,
87 (1982-83).
11. Kleinmuntz and Szucko gave a classic example of a case in which one of them testified
as an expert witness for the defendant. The defendant, a police officer, was accused of bur-
glarizing a house on his route. The prosecution suggested that if he would take a lie detector
and pass, they would drop the charges. At the urging of his lawyer, who believed that his
client was innocent and that the lie detector could be depended upon to reflect this, he took
the test. A problem arose, however, because while he was not responsible for the burglary,
he had made an agreement with the owners of the house to look after it while they were on
vacation, which was against departmental regulations. When he was asked if he had "cased"
the house on the night in question his emotional reaction was reflected on the polygraph. As
he realized what was being reflected on the polygraph he became even more upset by the
two questions that followed: "Did you steal the missing items from Mr. and Mrs. X's house
on the night of July 15th? Did you break into the rear door and enter the home of Mr. and
Mrs. X on the night of July 15th?" Id. at 91.
12. Lykken, supra note 9.
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of the test.1" However, they claim that an experienced examiner
can discover these potential problems by skillfully interviewing the
subject. They also acknowledge that under certain circumstances a
subject may have to be deemed untestable. For example, if an indi-
vidual is angry at having to take the test in the first place, this
undoubtedly will interfere with the results. Most polygraph experts
would agree that if the subject's anger cannot be defused, the test
should not be administered. 14
In an effort to gather information regarding the usefulness of
polygraph testing in the national security context, the Congres-
sional Office of Technology Assessment recently prepared a com-
prehensive report on the use of polygraphs. 15 After surveying the
literature in the field and interviewing polygraph examiners as well
as academic critics, the reporters concluded that the evidence of
the test's scientific validity and reliability was insufficient to sup-
port any firm conclusion. 16 The report noted that the reliability
rates achieved in the experiments reviewed varied dramatically. 7
It is of interest to note that in the Barland study, which is
widely cited by polygraph proponents as evidence of the poly-
graph's reliability, the examiner correctly identified 95% of the
subjects as guilty, but he also identified 55% of the truthful sub-
jects as deceptive. This tendency of the polygraph to identify
truthful subjects as lying is one of the primary concerns raised by
critics of polygraph testing."8
Because the test is never 100% accurate, as even its proponents
admit, and because it has a marked tendency to identify truthful
13. J. REID & F. INBAU, supra note 3, at 220; Raskin, The Polygraph in 1986: Scientific,
Professional and Legal Issues Surrounding Application and Acceptance of Polygraph Evi-
dence, 1986 UTAH L. REv. 29, 31 (1986).
14. J. REID & F. INBAU, supra note 3, at 220.
15. O.T.A., supra note 7.
16. Id.
17. In this context, reliability refers to the consistency with which different examiners
reach similar conclusions based on the same data. Another important measure is the validity
of the test. Validity can be defined as the extent to which the polygraph measures what it
claims to measure, i.e., the truthfulness of the subject. A test may be reliable in the sense
that examiners consistently reach similar conclusions based on the same data. However, if
those conclusions cannot be verified by reference to outside data, the test loses its useful-
ness. In other words, it must be established by outside evidence that the test is in fact
measuring deceit by its subjects for it to be accepted as valid. See Dworkin & Harris, Poly-
graph Tests: What Labor Arbitrators Need to Know, 41 ARB. J., March 1986, at 23, 25, 27-
32.
18. See Polygraphs and Employment, supra note 6, at 49.
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subjects as deceptive, truthful persons are routinely identified by
the polygraph as deceptive. If the test is given to ten persons, only
one of whom is guilty of wrongdoing, it may identify the guilty
party as lying. However, if there is a 28% false positive rate as one
study found, the test may also identify three innocent persons as
lying.' 9
The conclusion that polygraph testing is insufficiently reliable to
be used where important questions are at stake is supported by the
longstanding refusal of the vast majority of federal and state courts
to admit polygraph results into evidence. Beginning with Frye v.
United States,20 courts have consistently found that there is insuf-
ficient evidence of the test's scientific validity and reliability to
warrant its admission at trial.2 Courts which have recently ad-
dressed the issue of polygraph admissibility have acknowledged
19. Alpher & Blanton, The Accuracy of Lie Detection: Why Lie Tests Based on the Poly-
graph Should Not Be Admitted Into Evidence Today, 9 LAW & PSYCHOLOGY REV. 67, 70-71
(1985).
20. 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923).
21. The Supreme Court of Oregon recently did a thorough examination of the available
literature on the polygraph in deciding that polygraph results should not be admitted in any
civil or criminal trial. The court concluded that the value of such evidence was far out-
weighed by its prejudicial effect. State v. Brown, 297 Or. 404, 687 P.2d 751 (1984). For other
cases excluding polygraph evidence, see Pulaskis v. State, 476 P.2d 474 (Alaska 1970); State
v. Melendez, 121 Ariz. 1, 588 P.2d 294 (1978); People v. Anderson, 637 P.2d 354 (Colo.
1981); People v. Baynes, 88 Ill. 2d 225, 430 N.E.2d 1070 (1981); Conley v. Commonwealth,
382 S.W.2d 865 (Ky. 1964); State v. Corbin, 285 So. 2d 234 (La. 1973); Akonom v. State, 40
Md. App. 676, 394 A.2d 1213 (1978); People v. Liddell, 63 Mich. App. 491, 234 N.W.2d 669
(1975); Jordan v. State, 365 So. 2d 1198 (Miss. 1978), cert. denied, Jordan v. Mississippi, 444
U.S. 885 (1979); State v. Biddle, 599 S.W.2d 182 (Mo. 1980) (en banc); State v. McClean,
179 Mont. 178, 587 P.2d 20 (1978); State v. Steinmark, 195 Neb. 545, 239 N.W.2d 495
(1976); Fulton v. State, 541 P.2d 871 (Okla. Crim. App. 1975); Township of Silver Spring v.
Thompson, 90 Pa. Commw. 456, 496 A.2d 72 (1985); Commonwealth v. Brockington, 500 Pa.
216, 455 A.2d 627 (1983); Lewis v. State, 500 S.W.2d 167 (Tex. Crim. App. 1973); Romero v.
State, 493 S.W.2d 206 (Tex. Crim. App. 1973); State v. Frazier, 252 S.E.2d 39 (W. Va. 1979);
State v. Dean, 103 Wis. 2d 228, 307 N.W.2d 628 (1981). In federal court, the decision as to
whether polygraph results should be admitted is generally left to the discretion of the trial
judge, and such evidence is almost always excluded. See, e.g., United States v. Black, 684
F.2d 481 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1043 (1982); United States v. Winter, 663 F.2d
1120 (Ist Cir. 1981), cert. denied, Goldberg v. United States, 460 U.S. 1011 (1983); United
States v. Alexander, 526 F.2d 161 (8th Cir. 1975); United States ex rel. Sadowy v. Fay, 284
F.2d 426 (2d Cir. 1960), cert. denied, 365 U.S. 850 (1961).
Nevertheless, some commentators continue to argue that polygraphs have become more
sophisticated and should be admitted into evidence. See, e.g., J. REID & F. INBAU, supra note
3; Lester, Polygraph Evidence, Are the Courts Failing to Keep Abreast of Modern Technol-
ogy?, 5 CRIM. JUST. J. 33 (1981); Tarlow, Admissibility of Polygraph Evidence in 1975: An
Aid to Determining Credibility in a Perjury-Plagued System, 26 HASTINGS L.J. 917 (1975);
Comment, The Polygraph in California: A Heartbeat Away from Admissibility, 14 PAC. L.J.
1113 (1983).
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that the polygraph apparatus itself has become more sophisticated
since Frye. However, the basic objection remains the same: the
polygraph can measure a physiological reaction, but it cannot iden-
tify the reason for that reaction.22
Courts have also noted that polygraph results are significantly
different from other "scientific" evidence because an unusually
heavy weight rests with the examiner's interpretation of data. The
examiner's subjective impressions of the test taker's demeanor will
often play a role in the conclusions the examiner reaches. Concern
has also been expressed that the person providing background in-
formation to the examiner may, even inadvertently, make some
improper suggestion regarding the guilt of the subject.23
22. The only change in the treatment of polygraph evidence that perhaps warrants com-
ment is the fact that some courts in recent years have decided to admit test results when
the parties have agreed by stipulation prior to the test that the results will be admissible.
United States v. Oliver, 492 F.2d 943 (8th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 973 (1976). On
examination, many if not most of these cases involve a situation where a defendant volun-
teered to take the examination in the hope of clearing himself. In some cases, the defendant,
having consented in writing to take the test, and having agreed not to object to admission of
the results even if they are unfavorable to him, now seeks to have the unfavorable result
excluded. Some courts have concluded that the defendant cannot have it both ways and
have therefore enforced the stipulation.
Other courts have questioned the reasonableness of the policy of admitting stipulated
polygraph results since the basic concern is the reliability and validity of the results. The
North Carolina Supreme Court, for example, reversing an earlier decision, recently con-
cluded that all polygraph evidence should be excluded on the grounds of its questionable
validity, regardless of the existence of a stipulation to the contrary. As the court reasoned,
the fact that a stipulation was entered into does not make the results any more reliable.
State v. Grier, 307 N.C. 628, 300 S.E.2d 351 (1983), aff'd, 314 N.C. 59, 331 S.E.2d 669 (1985);
see also Biddle, 599 S.W.2d 182; Note, Stipulation Cannot Make Polygraph Results Admis-
sible, 47 Mo. L. REv. 586 (1982).
In reaffirming that polygraph evidence is not admissible, at least in the absence of a stipu-
lation, the court in United States v. Alexander stated:
While the polygraphic science and its instruments have advanced significantly since
the Frye case, we are still unable to conclude that there is sufficient scientific accepta-
bility and reliability to warrant the admission of the results of such tests in evidence.
There is an insufficient degree of assurance that polygraph machines and operators
are capable of discovering and controlling the many subtle abnormalities and factors
which affect test results.
United States v. Alexander, 526 F.2d 161, 166 (8th Cir. 1975).
The general rule against the admissibility of polygraphs appears to be holding its own,
despite the urgings of some advocates of polygraphs that it is time for a change. Those
opposing the use of polygraphs continue to make persuasive arguments urging their contin-
ued exclusion. See D. LYKKEN, A TREMoR IN THE BLOOD (1981); Kleinmutz & Szucko, supra
note 10; Comment, The Polygraph: Perceiving Us Or Deceiving Us?, 13 N.C. CENT. L.J. 84
(1981).
23. Alexander, 526 F.2d at 167 (citing United States v. Wilson, 361 F. Supp. 510, 512
(Md. 1973)).
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The importance of these concerns was borne out by a recent in-
formal experiment conducted by 60 Minutes on C.B.S. A 60 Min-
utes researcher, Janet Tobias, posed as a personnel assistant for
Popular Photography magazine. She informed three different pol-
ygraph companies that a camera had been stolen and that she
wanted their help in determining who had stolen it. Four employ-
ees of Popular Photography were informed of the experiment and
agreed to take polygraphs. In each case, Tobias told the polygraph
examiner of her suspicions regarding which employee had taken
the camera. She named a different employee to each polygrapher.
After administering the polygraphs to each of the four employees,
each examiner confirmed Tobias' suspicions and informed her that
the test results indicated deception by the person she suspected.
None of these employees had taken the camera. In fact, no camera
had been taken!
Concerns regarding the unreliability of polygraph testing as well
as employees' desires to be free from the intrusive and demeaning
test process have resulted in the passage of protective legislation in
twenty-one states. Six states, concluding that the unreliability of
the polygraph and its abusive use in the employment setting out-
weighed any possible benefit to employers, have prohibited the use
of polygraphs in private employment entirely.2 4 Six more states
have passed statutes prohibiting employers from requiring an em-
ployee to take such a test as a condition of employment. 5 And an
additional eight states mandate that an employer may not require,
request or even suggest such a test, presumably leaving the door
open for the employee who might wish to take one on his own initi-
ative in hopes of clearing himself.26 A federal bill limiting the use
of polygraphs in private employment, which recently passed the U.
S. House of Representatives, and a similar bill with bipartisan sup-
port, which was introduced in the Senate, further indicate the
widespread concern about the abusive use of polygraphs.2 7
24. D.C. CODE ANN. § 36-802 (1981); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 32, § 7166 (Supp. 1985);
MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 149, § 19B (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1986); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 181.75 (West
Supp. 1986); OR. REv. STAT. §§ 659.225, .227 (1985); W. VA. CODE § 21-5-56 (1985).
25. CAL. LAB. CODE § 432.2 (Deering Supp. 1986); HAW. REV. STAT. § 378-21 (1976); MD.
CODE ANN. art. 100, § 95 (1985); MONT. CODE ANN. § 39-2-304 (1985); 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN.
§ 7321 (Purdon 1985); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 49.44.120 (Supp. 1986).
26. ALASKA STAT. §§ 23, 10.037 (1985); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 31-51(g) (Supp. 1986); DEL.
CODE ANN. tit. 19, § 704 (1985); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 37.203 (West 1985); N.J. STAT.
ANN. § 2C:40A-1 (West 1985); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 28-6.1 (1979); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 494(a),
494(b) (Supp. 1985); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 111.37 (West Supp. 1985).
27. See H.R. REP. No. 1524, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. (1986); S. Doc. No. 1815, 99th Cong., 2nd
Sess. (1986).
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Limitations on the use of polygraphs in employment settings
have also developed through case law. At least one court has con-
cluded that given the unreliability of the polygraph test, an em-
ployee was within his rights in refusing to take such a test as a
condition of continued employment."
Labor arbitrators are split on whether polygraph results should
be admitted in employee discharge hearings because of concern
about their validity and reliability.2" An arbitrator's decision is
often affected by the terms of the collective bargaining agreement
involved. However, a termination based primarily or solely on pol-
ygraph results generally will not be upheld."0 Most arbitrators will
not uphold a discharge for refusing to take a polygraph examina-
tion, at least absent a prior contractual agreement by the employee
to submit to the test.
A factor which contributes to the unreliability of the polygraph
in the employment setting is that employees are frequently com-
pelled to take the test against their will."' This is a serious problem
28. Farmer v. City of Fort Lauderdale, 427 So. 2d 187 (Fla.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 816
(1983); see Note, Labor Law-Police Officer May Not Properly Be Dismissed for Refusing
to Submit to Polygraph Examination-Farmer v. City of Fort Lauderdale, 427 So. 2d 187
(Fla. 1983), 11 FLA. ST. U.L. REv. 697 (1983).
Florida does not have a statute regulating polygraphs. Nevertheless, the Florida Supreme
Court held that a policeman could not be discharged for his refusal to take a polygraph test.
The court reasoned that since a polygraph was not sufficiently reliable to warrant its admis-
sion in court, it would be unreasonable to uphold the dismissal of a police officer based on
his refusal to take the test. The court dismissed the employer's argument that the test was
useful as an investigative tool, concluding that this possible value of the test could not out-
weigh the police officer's right to be subjected to only reasonable orders.
Other courts have reached the opposite conclusion. In Smith v. American Cast Iron Pipe,
370 So. 2d 283 (Ala. 1979), the Alabama Supreme Court held that it was lawful to dismiss
an employee who refused to take a polygraph test after being advised to refuse by his law-
yer. The court noted that the employer's personnel policies explicitly made refusal to take a
polygraph grounds for termination. The court concluded that the employee's refusal to take
the polygraph was a refusal to cooperate in the investigation, which was sufficient grounds
for termination.
29. Janisch-Ramsey, Polygraphs: The Search for Truth in Arbitration Proceedings, 41
ARB. J., March 1986, at 34, 35-38.
30. Id. at 39; see also Nagle, supra note 1, at 74.
31. Nagle, supra note 1, at 75.
Most courts considering the question have held that an employee who is discharged for
refusing to take a polygraph examination is not guilty of misconduct and should not be
disqualified from receiving unemployment benefits. In Douthitt v. Kentucky Unemployment
Ins. Comm'n, 676 S.W.2d 472 (Ky. Ct. App. 1984), the court held that "an employer's re-
quirement that employees submit to polygraph examinations is an unreasonable rule. Poly-
graph examinations are unreliable . . . . It is unreasonable that an innocent employee
would be forced to risk loss of his reputation and future employment because of his em-
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because obtaining the voluntary cooperation of the subject is criti-
cal to achieving an accurate result.3 2 When an individual is forced
to take a polygraph examination, the resulting emotional reactions
of fear and anger make it impossible to achieve the desired test
setting. It may be difficult to say that employees ever truly volun-
tarily submit to such a test, since they may believe, often with
good reason, that refusal to submit will mean the loss of their jobs.
The importance of voluntariness is reflected in the examiner li-
censing statutes of sixteen states, which provide that a polygraph
operator may lose his license for failure to inform a subject that
the test is voluntary.
33
III. EMPLOYEE REMEDIES
Given the statistics that a substantial number of false positives
are likely to occur whenever polygraph tests are administered, it is
inevitable that innocent persons will be falsely accused of dishon-
esty and misconduct. When one considers the coercive atmosphere
often surrounding the administration of polygraphs in the employ-
ment setting, the likelihood of false positives occurring becomes
even greater.
What remedies are available to an employee who is discharged or
otherwise injured because of her employer's use or misuse of poly-
graph testing? In those jurisdictions where polygraph use is pro-
hibited or limited by statute, she may have a statutory remedy or a
cause of action for wrongful discharge. In the absence of a statute,
however, courts generally have been reluctant to recognize a cause
of action for wrongful discharge. Other remedies may be available.
There are several possibilities worth exploring. One of the major
ployer's requirement that he submit to a polygraph examination." Douthitt, 676 S.W.2d at
475 (citations omitted).
32. Township of Silver Spring v. Thompson, 90 Pa. Commw. 496, 456 A.2d (1985); OTA,
supra note 15, at 101. For model consent forms used by examiners, see J. REID & F. INBAU,
supra note 3, at 424.
33. ALA. CODE § 34-25-32 (1985); ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 32-2713 (Supp. 1985); ARM STAT.
ANN. § 71-2217 (1985); CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE §§ 9316, 9319 (Deering Supp. 1986); GA.
CODE ANN. § 84-5015 (Supp. 1985); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 37:2848 (West Supp. 1986); ME.
REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 32, §§ 7154, 7161 (Supp. 1985); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 338.1719
(West Supp. 1984); MISS. CODE ANN. § 73-29-31 (Supp. 1985); MONT. CODE ANN. § 37-62-212
(Supp. 1985); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 59, § 1468 (West Supp. 1985); OR. REV. STAT. § 703-210
(1985); S.C. CODE ANN. § 40-53-180 (Law. Co-op. 1986); TENN. CODE ANN. § 62-27-117 (1985);
TEx. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 4413(29cc) (19) (Vernon 1985); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 494(c)
(Supp. 1985).
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problems faced by employees who are discharged after they
"failed" or refused to take a polygraph is that their employer's ac-
tion in firing them under these circumstances has cast a shadow on
their honesty and integrity, making it difficult for them to find
other employment. A common law action for defamation may be
appropriate. Depending on the circumstances, causes of action for
intentional infliction of emotional distress and invasion of privacy
should also be considered.
The conduct of the polygraph examiner who administered the
test should be carefully reviewed. Was his conduct unduly coercive
or threatening? Did the examiner abide by licensing standards in
administering the test? A false positive could be the result of the
examiner's failure to use due care in administering the test. A suit
for negligent misrepresentation or malpractice may be appropriate.
A. Wrongful Discharge
Several statutes which prohibit the use of the polygraph in pri-
vate employment provide a civil remedy for employees injured by
their employer's breach of the statute.34 Where the statute pro-
vides only a criminal penalty, courts have held that employees who
are injured by their employer's violation of such a statute have a
cause of action for wrongful discharge in violation of public
policy.35
Employees have won impressive verdicts under this theory. 6
However, courts have generally refused to recognize such a cause of
action for wrongful discharge in violation of public policy in the
absence of a statute regulating employer use of polygraphs.37
34. D.C. CODE ANN. § 36-803(d) (1981); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 37.207 (West 1985);
MINN. STAT. ANN. § 181.75 (West Supp. 1986); O REv. STAT. § 659.225 (1983); VT. STAT.
ANN. tit. 21, § 494(d) (Supp. 1986); WAsH. REv. CODE ANN. § 49.44.120 (Cum. Supp. 1987);
W. VA. CODE § 21-5-5d (1985).
35. Perks v. Firestone Tire and Rubber Co., 611 F.2d 1363 (3rd Cir. 1979); Molush v.
Orkin Exterminating Co., 547 F. Supp. 54 (E.D. Pa. 1982); Moniodis v. Cook, 64 Md. App. 1,
494 A.2d 212, cert. denied, 304 Md. 631, 500 A.2d 649 (1985).
36. In Moniodis, the Maryland Supreme Court upheld a jury award in excess of one mil-
lion dollars. Moniodis, 64 Md. App. 1, 494 A.2d 212.
37. Smith v. American Cast Iron Pipe Co., 370 So. 2d 283 (Ala. 1979); Larsen v. Motor
Supply Co., 117 Ariz. 507, 573 P.2d 907 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1977); Ising v. Barnes Hosp., 674
S.W.2d 623 (Mo. Ct. App. 1984). Each of these cases involved the discharge of employees for
refusing to consent to a polygraph test.
But see Cordle v. General Hugh Mercer Corp., 325 S.E.2d 111 (W. Va. 1984), where the
court held that employees who were fired for refusing to take a polygraph did have a cause
of action for wrongful discharge. The court acknowledged that the West Virginia statute
1987]
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Courts differ on whether the wrongful discharge remedy is avail-
able only to an employee who has refused to submit to a poly-
graph, or whether it is also available to an employee who failed a
polygraph test taken against his will.38 Given the unreliability of
the polygraph, and the public policy involved, the better rule is
that where an employee is forced to take the test in violation of
state law, and is consequently discharged, a cause of action will be
recognized.
But what of those employees who are not protected by statute.
Do they have any recourse?
B. Suit Against Polygraph Operator for Breaching Duty of Care
to Employee
Consider the common situation in which the polygraph examiner
asks the employee subject to sign a consent form in compliance
with state law prior to taking a polygraph test. The employee ob-
jects, saying that he has not voluntarily agreed to take the test, but
believes he will be fired if he refuses. The examiner responds that
he cannot administer the test unless the employee signs the form
indicating that he is taking the test voluntarily. The employee,
caught in a no-win situation, signs the consent form. The poly-
graph examiner is aware that the employee's voluntary cooperation
is essential to a fair administration of the test and that the anger
and distress that the employee is feeling at this point may well
interfere with a proper reading.39 Nevertheless, he proceeds to ad-
minister the test. Does this action of the polygraph operator in ad-
ministering the test under questionable circumstances and in viola-
tion of the law, amount to a breach of duty of care to the
employee? This particular question has not yet been addressed by
limiting the use of polygraphs in employment was not effective until after these discharges
occurred and therefore did not apply to this case. However, the court concluded that this
statute was an embodiment of West Virginia's preexisting public policy that individual pri-
vacy was worthy of protection by the courts.
38. In Townsend v. L.W.M. Management, Inc., 64 Md. App. 55, 494 A.2d 239, cert. de-
nied, 304 Md. 300, 498 A.2d 1186 (1985), the court held that terminating an employee for
failing a polygraph examination did not give rise to a cause of action for wrongful discharge,
even though administering the test in the first instance was clearly a breach of public policy.
Id. at -, 494 A.2d at 274; see also Moniodis, 64 Md. App. 1, 494 A.2d 212. On the other
hand, in Polsky v. Radio Shack, 666 F.2d 824 (3rd Cir. 1981), the court found a cause of
action for wrongful discharge where the employee claimed she had been discharged because
of the results of an illegally administered polygraph.
39. J. REID & F. INBAU, supra note 3, at 220.
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the courts. However, courts have held that a polygraph operator
has a duty to the employee to use due care in administering a
test.40
In Zampatori v. United Parcel Service,41 the plaintiff framed his
cause of action against the polygraph operator as one for negligent
misrepresentation. There was a question of fact as to whether the
plaintiff's discharge had been based on the polygraph operator's
report that the plaintiff had shown deception on key questions in
his polygraph examination. Nonetheless, the court held that all of
the elements of an action for negligent misrepresentation were pre-
sent and thus, plaintiff could proceed to develop his evidence on
this issue. The elements cited by the court were: 1) knowledge that
the information is needed for a serious purpose; 2) the party re-
ceiving it intends to rely on and act upon it; 3) injury has resulted
because of this reliance; and 4) the relationship of the parties is
such that assigning a duty of care and permitting reliance is
appropriate.42
The court found that Doyle Detective Bureau knew the poly-
graph test results were needed by U.P.S. for a serious purpose and
that U.P.S. could reasonably be expected to rely on the test re-
sults. Zampatori, the plaintiff employee, was likely to be injured by
U.P.S.'s reliance on the results if they inaccurately indicated that
he was responsible for the missing funds.
The court found that since Zampatori's continued employment
was likely to be affected by the test results and since such impact
was reasonably foreseeable, the Agency owed him a duty to admin-
ister the test with due care.
The court in Lawson v. Howinet Aluminum Corp.43 also based
its finding of a duty on the part of the polygraph operator to the
employee on the grounds that it was reasonably foreseeable that
the employee would be directly affected by the outcome of the test.
Therefore, the polygraph operator had a duty to administer the
40. See, e.g., Lawson v. Howinet Aluminum Corp., 449 N.E.2d 1172 (Ind. Ct. App. 1983);
Zampatori v. United Parcel Service, 125 Misc. 2d 405, 479 N.Y.S.2d 470 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.
1984).
41. 125 Misc. 2d 405, 479 N.Y.S.2d 470.
42. See International Prod. Co. v. Erie R.R., 244 N.Y. 331, 155 N.E. 662, cert. denied, 275
U.S. 527 (1927).
43. 449 N.E.2d 1172.
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test fairly, impartially and with due care. However, at least one
state has established such a duty of care by statute.""
Most polygraph experts would agree that the voluntary coopera-
tion of the subject is essential to achieve reliable results. This
point is acknowledged by the licensing statutes of at least sixteen
states. Each includes a provision that failure to inform a subject
that his participation in the examination is voluntary may be
grounds for suspension or revocation of the operator's license.45
Given this situation, it would appear that a polygraph operator
has a duty not to administer a test where the subject tells him that
he does not wish to take the test and will only take it because he is
afraid he will be fired if he refuses. If the polygraph operator pro-
ceeds to administer the test knowing the employee has not volun-
tarily consented, he may be held liable to the employee for breach-
ing his duty to use reasonable care in the administration of the
test.
Of course, a polygraph operator will generally not administer a
test to a subject unless the subject signs a consent form. This may
protect the operator from an allegation that he failed to ensure
that the subject consented to the test. However, at least two courts
have held that a signed consent form is only one piece of evidence
a jury may consider in determining whether the subject truly con-
sented to the examination.46
Other circumstances which might give rise to a cause of action
are situations where the examiner fails to ascertain health
problems of the employee which may interfere with the results, or
proceeds even with knowledge of such problems. Additionally, in
those situations where an examiner inaccurately reports an em-
ployee admission, an action for negligent, or even intentional mis-
representation or fraud may be appropriate.
C. Defamation
Defamatory statements are made routinely in the context of em-
ployer use of polygraph examinations. The question is, are they
actionable? Courts have long recognized the special injury that is
done to an individual who is slandered in connection with his work
44. GA. CODE ANN. § 43-36-15 (Supp. 1986).
45. See sources cited supra note 33.
46. Polsky v. Radio Shack, 666 F.2d 824 (3rd Cir. 1981); Townsend v. L.W.M. Manage-
ment Inc., 64 Md. App. 55, 494 A.2d 239, cert. denied, 304 Md. 300, 498 A.2d 1186 (1985).
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or profession.4" If one can prove the defamatory statement, then
the damages to reputation need not be proved; they are presumed
so long as the subject is neither a public official nor a public
figure.4 s
On the other hand, courts have also recognized the need employ-
ers have to make defamatory communications about employees in
conducting investigations of employee misconduct and sharing in-
formation about potential employees. As a result, courts have held
that defamatory communications by employers are protected by a
qualified privilege so long as they are made in good faith and for a
reasonable purpose.49
In order for a defamatory statement to be actionable, the plain-
47. L. ELDREDGE, THE LAW OF DEFAMATION 123, 144-49 (1978); W. PROSSER & W. KEETON,
THE LAW OF TORTS § 112, at 790-92 (5th ed. 1984); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 573
(1977).
48. Where a public official or public figure is involved, the common law presumption of
damages is no longer applicable. Actual damages must be proven. See New York Times v.
Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964); Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974), aff'd, 680
F.2d 527 (7th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1226 (1983).
With the recent decision in Dun and Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472
U.S. 749 (1985), it is clear that state courts have the freedom to continue to apply tradi-
tional common law principles in defamation cases not involving matters of public concern.
Mutafis v. Erie Ins. Exch., 775 F.2d 593 (4th Cir. 1985); Davis v. Ross, 107 F.R.D. 326
(S.D.N.Y. 1985). However, it is noteworthy that before Dun and Bradstreet, the RESTATE-
MENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, supra note 47, § 621, took the position that even if the constitu-
tional rule did not apply to private parties, the common-law rule as to presumed damages
should be abrogated. See W. PROSSER & W. KEETON, supra note 47, § 116A, at 843.
Nevertheless, most courts reached the conclusion that Gertz had no application to suits in
private employment even before Dun and Bradstreet. See Calero v. Del Chem. Corp., 68
Wis. 2d 487, 228 N.W.2d 737 (1975); Stuempges v. Parke Davis & Co., 297 N.W.2d 252
(Minn. 1980); Annotation, Defamation: Application of New York Times and Related Stan-
dards to Nonmedia Defendants, 38 A.L.R.4TH 1114 (1985).
On the other hand, in applying Gertz in the employment context prior to Dun & Brad-
street, the Maryland Court of Appeals decided that the common law presumption of dam-
ages for slander per se would no longer apply. Jacron Sales Co. v. Sindorf, 276 Md. 580, 350
A.2d 688 (1976). In this suit by an employee against his former employer, the court held
that the employee would be required to prove actual injury to his reputation. However, the
result in this case seems to have been limited by a subsequent decision in Hearst Corp. v.
Hughes, 297 Md. 112, 466 A.2d 486 (1983), where the issue was whether Gertz abolished the
presumption of injury to reputation when a plaintiff was injured in his business. The court
held that a plaintiff could not presume damages. However, the court went on to hold that
the existence of a cause of action could be established by a presumption, and the plaintiff
could then proceed to prove separate damages for emotional distress. See Hearst Corp. v.
Hughes-The Presumption of Injury to Reputation in Per Se Defamation Actions Is Not
Dead, 44 MD. L. REV. 688 (1985) (analysis supporting the court's conclusion); see also
Rogozinski v. Airstream by Angell, 152 N.J. Super. 133, 377 A.2d 807 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law
Div. 1977), modified, 164 N.J. Super. 465, 397 A.2d 334 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1979).
49. L. ELDREDGE, supra note 47, at 473.
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tiff must prove that it was published or communicated to a third
party.50 The defendant will then have the opportunity to raise the
affirmative defenses of truth and privilege.51 If a privilege is estab-
lished, the plaintiff may attempt to establish malice or abuse of the
privilege.2
1. Publication
At least one court has held that the act of discharging an em-
ployee who failed a polygraph test amid allegations of misconduct,
where other employees were aware of the circumstances of the dis-
charge, is a defamatory publication. However, that court did not
50. Id. at 206.
51. Id. at 333.
52. Id. at 509.
53. Tyler v. Mack Stores, 275 S.C. 456, 272 S.E.2d 633 (1980). Though the court's reason-
ing is not discussed in any detail in this opinion, it appears that the court may have con-
cluded that publication to the plaintiff's co-workers was reasonably forseeable.
On the other hand, in Smith v. Greyhound Lines, 614 F. Supp. 558 (W.D. Pa. 1984), aff'd,
800 F.2d 1139 (3d Cir. 1986), the court held that evidence that employees were discussing
plaintiff's termination was not sufficient to hold the defendant responsible for republication.
The court held that the employee had the burden of proving a particular incident of im-
proper publication by an employer representative to hold the company responsible for the
spread of these rumors.
The most useful standard to apply in these situations is probably the one proposed by
Professor Prosser. He suggested that so long as those publications made by the employer are
done for a reasonable purpose and using a reasonable method, no liability should result if
the communication is incidentally read or overheard by a person to whom there is no privi-
lege to publish. W. PROSSER & W. KEErON, supra note 47, § 115, at 833. However, Prosser
goes on to note that the fact that there may be an incidental publication to an improper
person is a factor to consider in determining whether the method chosen for communication
is a reasonable one. Id.
In Tumbarella v. Kroger Co., 85 Mich. App. 482, 271 N.W.2d 284 (1978), the court said
that the defendant could be held responsible because employees in various Kroger stores
had heard that the plaintiff was fired for stealing. A Kroger manager had sent a letter in-
forming Kroger store managers of the plaintiff's dismissal for theft. However, the letter was
not marked confidential, and given its highly inflammatory content, the court felt that the
manager could have foreseen republication under these circumstances. Id. at -, 271
N.W.2d at 290.
Circumstantial evidence of such republication was held to be sufficient in Tumbarella,
and in Agriss v. Roadway Express, Inc., 334 Pa. Super. 295, 483 A.2d 456 (1984). In Agriss,
the evidence showed that plaintiff's co-employees were discussing the fact that he had been
chastised for allegedly opening company mail. As plaintiff had told only his union represen-
tative about this accusation, and the representative denied repeating it, the court held that
there was sufficient circumstantial evidence of the company's responsibility for republica-
tion to go to the jury. Id. at -, 483 A.2d at 466.
The general rule is that whether an unintentional negligent communication will be treated
as an actionable publication will depend on whether the inadvertent publication was fore-
seeable. L. ELDREDGE, supra note 47, at 217.
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address the question of whether this publication was privileged.
Undoubtedly, the original communication from the employer to
the polygraph examiner indicating that this employee is suspected
of theft is a defamatory publication. 4 The communication by the
polygraph operator to the employer of his conclusions that the
subject was deceptive is a defamatory publication. 55 A communica-
tion by the employer to a prospective employer indicating that the
employee was fired for failing a polygraph examination can cer-
tainly be seen as a defamatory publication. Firing an employee
54. It is assumed for purposes of this article that the polygraph examiner is an indepen-
dent contractor, and not an employee of the corporation. Even if the examiner is an em-
ployee, the majority rule would still find a publication under these circumstances. A few
courts have confused the question of whether a statement has been published with the ques-
tion of whether a privilege should apply, but the majority rule is that intracorporate com-
munication of a defamatory statement is sufficient publication. W. PROSSER & W. KEETON,
supra note 47, § 113, at 798-99, RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, supra note 47, § 577. For
a recent discussion of this issue, see Note, Libel and Slander, Intracorporate Communica-
tions as Publications to Third Persons-Luttrell v. United Tel. Sys., 33 U. KAN. L. REV. 759
(1985); see also Elbeshbeshy v. Franklin Inst., 618 F. Supp. 170 (E.D. Pa. 1985); Brantley v.
Zantop Int'l Airlines, 617 F. Supp. 1032 (E.D. Mich. 1985); Southern Bell Tel. & Tel. Co. v.
Barnes, 443 So. 2d 1085 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1984); Frankson v. Design Space Int'l, 380
N.W.2d 560 (Minn. Ct. App.), afl'd in part and rev'd in part, 394 N.W.2d 140 (Minn. 1986).
55. Generally, after administering a polygraph test, the examiner will communicate the
results to the employer in a form similar to the following: "Subject showed a reaction to
questions 5 and 8 which is generally indicative of deception. Questions 5 and 8 in this exam-
ple would be relevant questions, such as: "Did you take $20 out of the cash drawer for your
own personal use?" J. REID & F. INBAU, supra note 3. The substance of the examiner's report
in this context accuses the employee of dishonesty as well as possible involvement in theft."
56. In the absence of proof that the employer published the defamatory statement to a
prospective employer, the employee might try to establish publication by the compelled
publication theory, though to date it has only been adopted in a few jurisdictions. This
theory is a response to the dilemma faced by an employee who is fired and attempts to seek
other employment. When asked why the employee left the former employer, the employee
may have no choice but to repeat the slanderous charge made by the former employer. In
Lewis v. Equitable Life Assurance Soc'y, 361 N.W.2d 875 (Minn. Ct. App. 1985), afl'd in
part and rev'd in part, 389 N.W.2d 876 (Minn. 1986) the court held that since the plaintiff
employees were under a strong compulsion to republish the defamatory statement made by
their former employer to prospective employers, the former employer could be held respon-
sible for this republication. Equitable Life had fired four employees, falsely accusing them
of gross insubordination. Id.
The court in Lewis noted that generally, the maker of a defamatory statement would not
be liable for republication of the defamatory statement by the person defamed. However,
the court decided that where the defendant could reasonably foresee that the employee
would be under a strong compulsion to republish the statement, the defendant could be
held liable. Id. at 880-81. This reasoning was applied under similar circumstances in McKin-
ney v. County of Santa Clara, 110 Cal. App. 3d 787, 168 Cal. Rptr. 89 (1980), where a dis-
charged police officer argued that he was compelled by circumstances to repeat slanderous
charges to prospective employers, and Neighbors v. Kirksville College of Osteopathic
Medicine, 694 S.W.2d 822 (Mo. Ct. App. 1985) where the defendants gave their discharged
employee a letter of reference containing defamatory statements. See also Colonial Stores,
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for refusing to take a polygraph examination may also be seen as
publication of a defamatory statement.57
However, the central question is whether any or all of these pub-
lications are protected by a qualified privilege. If so, they are not
actionable.
2. Qualified Privilege
A qualified privilege is said to attach to a communication
made in good faith on any subject matter in which the person com-
municating has an interest, or in reference to which he has a right or
duty, if made to a person having a corresponding interest or duty on
a privileged occasion and in a manner and under circumstances
fairly warranted by the occasion and duty, right or interest .. 5
In determining whether a qualified privilege should attach to the
communication of a defamatory statement, the courts generally
balance the interests of the parties involved. The determination of
whether an interest is of sufficient importance to give rise to a
qualified privilege "depends upon a comparison of the advantages
to the publisher's interest if the defamatory matter should be true,
with the harm to the other's reputation if the defamatory matter
should prove to be false. '"59
Where defamatory statements by employers regarding their em-
ployees are involved, the courts have generally concluded, implic-
Inc. v. Barrett, 73 Ga. App. 839, 38 S.E.2d 306 (1946).
This approach may appear to increase unduly employer exposure in this area. However, it
has the merit of taking into consideration the serious problem faced by an employee who is
unjustly accused and discharged. The employee faces the prospect of divulging his em-
ployer's reason for discharging the employee, and most likely being denied new employment.
The employer can risk lying about the reason for his discharge, and live with the fear of
possible discovery later on.
57. There appear to be no cases in the employment context on this point. However, at
least one court has held that a statement that an individual has refused to take a polygraph
in the context of an investigation of arson is actionable defamation as a matter of law. Mol-
nar v. Star-Ledger, 193 N.J. Super. 12, 471 A.2d 1209 (N.J. Super Ct. App. Div.), cert. de-
nied, 99 N.J. 162, 491 A.2d 674 (1984). The court explained that it was "satisfied that the
statement that Molnar refused to take a lie detector test, when examined in the context of
the reference to probable arson, is likely to excite adverse, derogatory or unpleasant feelings
or opinions and as such, clearly 'sounds to the disreputation' of Molnar." Id. at 1212 (cita-
tions omitted).
58. Annotation, Defamation: Loss of Employer's Qualified Privilege to Publish Employ-
ees' Work Record or Qualification, 24 A.L.RATH 144, 149 (1983).
59. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF ToRTs, supra note 47, § 594(a).
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itly if not explicitly, that the employer's interest in employing only
trustworthy employees outweighs the employee's interest in her
reputation."0
Undoubtedly, an employer's communications with employees
and supervisors must be protected to the degree necessary to en-
able the employer to carry out a reasonable investigation.6' How-
60. In an unusual exception to the general rule, the court in Tumbarella v. Kroger Co., 85
Mich. App. 482, 271 N.W.2d 284 (1978) refused to find the employer's defamatory commu-
nication privileged, reasoning that the employee's interest in his reputation and ability to
make a living outweighed the employer's interest in making the communication. The court
in Harrison v. Arrow Metal Prod. Corp., 20 Mich. App. 590,._, 174 N.W.2d 875, 887 (1970),
concluded that the likely injury to the defamed employee outweighed any possible damage
to the employer involved, and refused to recognize a privilege. As the court said:
Contemplate the effect of an accusation, as here made, upon the future life of the
employee. Any prospective employer generally requires an applicant to furnish the
names of all prior employers. In one way or another the prospective employer usually
contacts prior employers. This one unproved accusation could then become the basis
for permanently depriving a man of his dignity, good name, self-respect and right to
earn for the support of himself and his family.
Id.
The fact that what is occurring in this context is a balancing of interests is seldom ac-
knowledged. In a rare analysis of the role played by a qualified privilege, the court in Riggs
v. Cain, 406 So. 2d 1202 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1981) noted:
The concept of qualified privilege as applied in this case represents a delicate balance
between society's concerns for the rights of individuals to be protected from false and
defamatory statements which may seriously affect an individual's reputation and
ability to secure employment, and the rights of employers to freely comment upon
and receive relevant information as to an employee's past work performance.
Id. at 1204.
The court went on to reach the unusual conclusion that the question of whether the em-
ployer's statement should be protected by a qualified privilege was best resolved by the jury.
61. Annotation, Libel and Slander: Privileged Nature of Communication to Other Em-
ployees or Employees' Union of Reasons for Plaintiff's Discharge, 60 A.L.R.3D 1080 (1974).
Courts which have found a privilege to communicate to employees at large have generally
based it upon the ground that disclosure was necessary to improve employee morale or dis-
courage similar misconduct. However, upon close examination this reasoning is subject to
question. For example, in Happy 40, Inc. v. Miller, 63 Md. App. 24, 491 A.2d 1210, cert.
denied, 304 Md. 299, 498 A.2d 1185, cert. denied, Miller v. Happy 40, Inc., 304 Md. 299, 498
A.2d 1185 (1985), the court held that the employer had a qualified privilege to communicate
to plaintiff's former co-workers that she had been discharged for theft. The employee had
an unblemished record of honesty and good work performance. The employer did not con-
front the employee with his suspicions before terminating her. It was later established that
plaintiff was not the guilty party. Nevertheless, the court found that the employer had a
qualified privilege to inform the plaintiff's co-workers that he had fired her because he sus-
pected her of stealing. Id. at -, 491 A.2d at 1216. The court explained that if the employer
"were not permitted to tell them his reasons, he would run the risk of appearing arbitrary
and capricious. This would affect the remaining employees' morale and sense of security and
such a situation would not be in the best interests of the appellants." Id.
Given that the defendant fired this employee without confronting her and that she was a
reliable employee who was never charged with any crime, it might be argued that the em-
ployer's action here was arbitrary and the other employees had good reason to feel insecure.
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ever, does it necessarily follow that communications to a polygraph
operator should also be privileged?
The answer is, not necessarily. If one applies the balancing of
harms notion, the damage that may be done to an innocent em-
ployee's reputation could easily outweigh the value of the poly-
graph to the employer.
Of course, this conclusion would depend upon one's view of the
validity and reliability of the polygraph. If one sees the polygraph
as inherently unreliable, it is of little value to the employer. At the
same time, the danger posed to the employee by the possibility of
a false reading is great.6 2 Certainly an employer's right to investi-
In any case, the court made no effort to attempt to balance the plaintiff's interest in her
reputation against the employer's interest in having his business run smoothly. For other
cases reaching a similar conclusion, see Hall v. Rice, 117 Neb. 813, 223 N.W. 4 (1929), over-
ruled on other grounds, Whitcomb v. Nebraska State Educ. Ass'n, 184 Neb. 31, 165 N.W.2d
99 (1969); Kroger Co. v. Young, 210 Va. 564, 172 S.E.2d 720 (1970).
Other courts have expressed a more limited view of how broadly the employer's privilege
to communicate should reach. It has been held that communications to employees at large
are not protected because they serve only the employer's interest in attempting to quell
rumors and restore morale. Sias v. General Motors Co., 372 Mich. 542, 127 N.W.2d 357
(1964). Sias was superseded by statute as-stated in Wojciechowski v. General Motors Corp.,
151 Mich. App. 399, 390 N.W.2d 727 (1986). The employees have no corresponding interest
or duty in receiving the communication. Id. As the court in Sias stated:
[W]e hold that in calling in fellow employees of plaintiff and 'explaining' the cir-
cumstances of his separation, defendant-corporation was serving its own particular
interest. That interest. . . was to restore morale in the plant protection force and to
quiet rumors that were circulating among its members, adversely affecting the com-
pany. These men were not supervisors, personnel department representatives, nor
company officials. They were simply fellow employees in the identical work. No privi-
lege extended to the communication to them and the trial court properly so held.
Id. at -, 127 N.W.2d at 360. This position appears to be gaining support. See, e.g., Haddad
v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 526 F.2d 83 (6th Cir. 1975) (relying on Sias to deny qualified
privilege to communicate reason for resignation to fellow employees); Dillard Dep't Stores,
Inc. v. Felton, 276 Ark. 304, 634 S.W.2d 135 (1982) (employer's statement exceeded what
was necessary to the situation); Drennen v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 328 So. 2d 52 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 1976) (meeting script read to 300 employees not privileged because it served
employer's own interest); Arison Shipping Co. v. Smith, 311 So. 2d 739 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1975) (statements, even if only to employees, are not protected), cert. denied, 327 So. 2d 31
(Fla. 1976); Flughum v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 424 Mich. 89, 378 N.W.2d 472 (1985)
(employer is not privileged to communicate needlessly to fellow employees); Romano v.
United Buckingham Freight Lines, 4 Wash. App. 929, 484 P.2d 450 (1971) (whether em-
ployer had authority to reveal reason for employer's discharge).
62. The question of the existence of a privilege could also be affected by state law regulat-
ing the use of polygraphs. If the particular jurisdiction prohibits the use of polygraphs in
employment, it is apparent that no privilege to communicate should attach. On the other
hand, if state law provides that polygraphs may be administered so long as they are not
used as a condition of continued employment, existence of a privilege might turn on
whether the employee took the test with the impression that refusal to take the test would
result in dismissal. A similar question would arguably arise in those jurisdictions whose
polygraph licensing statutes provide that tests may only be administered to voluntary
subjects.
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gate misconduct by his employees is worthy of protection, but the
question is, aren't there other, more reliable, less potentially dan-
gerous ways to conduct an investigation?
Three reported cases address the question of whether a qualified
privilege should attach to communications from an employer to a
polygraph operator.63 Two of these cases apparently rely on a find-
ing that by consenting to take the polygraph examination, the em-
ployee consented to the publication of the defamatory statement
to the polygraph operator.6 4 It is well established that when the
victim of a defamatory statement consents to its publication, it is
not actionable.6 5
In Borden, Inc. v. Wallace,"' the plaintiff was suspected of theft.
He objected to his employer's communications to the polygraph
operator, but the court found that by consenting to the test, the
plaintiff had consented to these communications.
In consenting to this test, he must have known that the test could
not be conducted without the operator being told what the charges
or circumstances were. Thus, he consented to [the polygraph opera-
tor's] being told by [his employer] that he, [the employee], was sus-
pected of committing dishonest acts at the Wuest Store.6 7
The court found that there was no evidence of malice in these
communications and reversed the jury verdict for plaintiff.
In Montgomery v. Big B, Inc.,"s the court held that since the
corporate officers had a duty to investigate missing store receipts,
and since their communication of relevant facts to the polygraph
operator was necessary to the competent administration of the
test, this was a privileged occasion as a matter of law. The court
did not directly address the propriety of Big B's use of a polygraph
operator in its investigation. However, the court noted that plain-
tiff had voluntarily agreed to take the polygraph examination. 9
63. Montgomery v. Big B., Inc., 460 So. 2d 1286 (Ala. 1984); Clements v. Ryan, 382 So. 2d
279 (La. Ct. App. 1980); Borden, Inc. v. Wallace, 570 S.W.2d 445 (Tex. Ct. App. 1978).
64. Montgomery, 460 So. 2d 1286; Borden, 570 S.W.2d 445.
65. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, supra note 47, § 583; L. ELDREDGE, supra note 47, §
61, at 317.
66. 570 S.W.2d at 445.
67. Id. at 448.
68. 460 So. 2d 1286.
69. Id.
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In Clements v. Ryan,70 the court held that the employer was
protected by a qualified privilege while making communications
necessary in investigating the suspected wrongdoings of his em-
ployees, and this covered his communication with the polygraph
operator. In an unusual twist in that case, the polygraph operator
found the plaintiff to be innocent of any wrongdoing, but the em-
ployer remained unconvinced of the employee's innocence and
fired her.7 1
Experts agree that since a polygraph test can only be properly
administered to a voluntary subject, there should be no privilege to
communicate to the examiner in the absence of the subject's con-
sent. If a polygraph test is given without the subject's voluntary
cooperation, the results are likely to be inaccurate.7 2 Thus, a privi-
lege to communicate to the polygraph operator should not be rec-
ognized under these circumstances. Certainly the harm done to the
employee's reputation is likely to outweigh the value of an inaccu-
rate test to the employer.
As noted above, it has been held that firing an employee who
fails a polygraph test amid allegations of employee misconduct is
publication of a defamatory statement. However, it must be deter-
mined whether this publication is privileged. This determination
will depend on whether the employer's actions were reasonable
under the circumstances. In the absence of the polygraph examina-
tion, if an employer fired an employee whom he reasonably sus-
pected of misconduct after making some attempt to verify this sus-
picion, this action would probably be protected by a qualified
privilege.
However, a slightly different circumstance presents itself where
the employer has not carried out a reasonable investigation, but
instead resorts to subjecting all of the employees in a particular
store to polygraph testing in order to find out why there is a
shortage in the inventory. Three employees "fail" the polygraph
examination, and they are fired as a result. Their fellow employees
are thus given the impression that they were guilty of theft. Given
the inherent unreliability of polygraph examinations, and the em-
ployer's failure to carry out any other investigation, it may be ar-
gued that the potential harm to the employees' reputations
70. 382 So. 2d 279.
71. See J. REID & F. INBAU, supra note 3, at 20.
72. See L. ELDREDGE, supra note 47, §§ 93-94, at 508-35.
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through this publication outweighs the employer's interest in using
the polygraph examination to attempt to protect his business from
theft. The employer has no substantial reason to believe that the
polygraph examination has indeed identified the culprits. He may
very well fire the employees who failed the test, and find that
shortages continue. The employees' reputations, on the other hand,
will be severely damaged by a termination under these circum-
stances. Their reputations in the eyes of their fellow employees will
be diminished. Their ability to find other work may be severely
hampered.
Another issue worthy of consideration is whether an employer's
communication to a prospective employer that he discharged an
employee for failing or refusing to take a polygraph examination is
protected by a qualified privilege. Applying the balancing of harms
notion, the case against recognizing a privilege is at least as strong
as in the situations discussed up to this point. The injury to the
employee likely to result from such a communication is clear: he
will lose an employment opportunity. On the other hand, the value
of this communication to the prospective employer is highly ques-
tionable. Again, one's conclusion will depend on one's view of the
reliability of the polygraph examination.
3. Abuse of Privilege or Malice
Once a privilege has been recognized, it may of course be lost if
the privileged occasion has been abused. Courts have traditionally
defined abuse of privilege in terms of a finding of malice. 3
There is a great deal of disagreement and confusion in the case
law as to what constitutes malice. 4 Some courts take the position
that common law malice refers primarily to ill will or personal ani-
mosity.7 5 Other courts have historically recognized that malice may
exist where there is a lack of good faith, where a charge is made
without any reasonable evidence of its truth, or where the em-
73. In order to avoid the confusion resulting from the many definitions of malice, the
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) speaks in terms of abuse of the privilege. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
TORTS, supra note 47, § 593.
74. See Stuempges v. Parke, Davis & Co., 297 N.W.2d 252, 257-58 (Minn. 1980).
75. De Ronde v. GayTime Shops, Inc., 239 F.2d 735, 738 (2d Cir. 1956); Andrews v. Mo-
hawk Rubber Co., 474 F. Supp. 1276, 1282 (E.D. Ark. 1979); Bratt v. IBM, 392 Mass. 508,
-, 467 N.E.2d 126, 133 (1984); Bacon v. Michigan Cent. R. Co., 66 Mich. 166, 33 N.W. 181,
184-85 (1887); Kroger Grocery & Baking Co. v. Harpole, 175 Miss. 227, -, 166 So. 335, 338-
39 (1936).
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ployer acts in reckless disregard of the rights of his employees.
Several courts have concluded that an employer's failure to verify
or properly investigate charges before terminating employees may
be evidence of malice. With the advent of the United States Su-
preme Court's decisions in New York Times Co. v. Sullivan 7 and
Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc.,78 yet another definition of malice has
been introduced into the equation.79
76. After Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974), a few courts and the RESTATE-
MENT took the position that all defamation actions should be governed by constitutional
considerations, and the common law standards should be abandoned. See, e.g., Jacron Sales
Co. v. Sindorf, 276 Md. 580, 350 A.2d 688 (1976). In Marchesi v. Franchino, 283 Md. 131,
387 A.2d 1129 (1978), the Maryland Court of Appeals held that common law malice and
malice, as defined in New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964), are incompatible
legal standards. The court determined that the New York Times standard alone should be
applied in all future defamation cases. See Marchesi, 283 Md. at -, 387 A.2d at 1133.
The position taken by the Maryland courts is a miniority one. Most courts faced with the
question of the impact of Gertz on cases involving non-media defendants and matters of no
public concern have declined to apply Gertz. See, e.g., Roemer v. Retail Credit Co., 44 Cal.
App. 3d 926, 935-36, 119 Cal. Rptr. 82, 87-88 (1975); Rowe v. Metz, 195 Colo. 424, -, 579
P.2d 83, 84 (1978); Wheeler v. Green, 286 Or. 99, -, 593 P.2d 777, 784 (1979); Harley-
Davidson Motorsports, Inc. v. Markley, 279 Or. 361, -, 568 P.2d 1359, 1365 (1977); Hous-
ton Belt & Terminal Ry. v. Wherry, 548 S.W.2d 743 (Tex. Civ. App. 1976), appeal dis-
missed, 434 U.S. 962 (1977); Stuempges, 297 N.W.2d at 258; Calero v. Del Chem. Corp., 68
Wis. 2d 487, -, 228 N.W.2d 737, 745 (1975).
With the Supreme Court's decision in Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc.,
472 U.S. 749 (1985), it appears likely that common law standards will continue to apply to
employee suits for defamation in most jurisdictions.
The New York Times definition of malice, "reckless disregard of truth," is of marginal
utility in such suits. The concern is not what the employer's subjective attitude toward the
truth is, but rather, whether he has abused a privileged occasion by his unnecessarily harm-
ful acts. When the New York Times standard is applied, the court might consider what an
employer's attitude towards the reliability of the polygraph is, rather than objectively con-
sidering the reasonableness of the employer's reliance on the machine. However, a version of
the reckless disregard of truth standard existed in defamation actions long before New York
Times, and it appears to be a useful standard to continue to apply in the employment set-
ting. See Bacon, 66 Mich. at -, 33 N.W. at 184-85. In Bacon, the court described two
definitions of malice, one being the ordinary meaning of ill will against a person, and the
other being a wrongful act done intentionally without just cause or excuse. It labeled these
two malice in fact and malice in law. The court concluded that malice could be found where
a charge was made without any reasonable evidence of its truth, as where an accusation was
made without an investigation being made into its truth. Id. This is an objective standard,
distinguishable from the subjective New York Times standard. The New York Times stan-
dard asks whether the publisher in fact entertained serious doubts as to the truth of the
published statement, and not necessarily whether the defendant conducted a reasonable in-
vestigation prior to publishing. Grebner v. Runyon, 132 Mich. App. 327, -, 347 N.W.2d
741, 744 (1984).
77. 376 U.S. 254.
78. 418 U.S. 323.
79. Malice has been defined simply as reckless disregard for an employee's rights under
the circumstances. See, e.g., Stephens v. Columbia Pictures Corp., 240 F.2d 764, 767 (2d
Cir.) (defining malice as reckless disregard or ill will), cert. denied, Columbia Pictures Corp.
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The common law "ill will" standard appears to have a relatively
limited application in today's large and often impersonal work-
places. It developed under very different conditions than exist to-
day, at a time when workplaces tended to be smaller and employer
and employees worked side by side. Today, though it is certainly
true that personal animosity can develop between managers and
employees, and may be a factor in a defamation law suit, the more
widespread and critical problem is the disregard of employees' in-
terests by large and impersonal employers. In this context, the per-
sonal relationship between employer and employee becomes less
important. The important factor is the employer's regard for the
rights of his employees to be treated in a reasonable and lawful
manner. In this context, the definition of malice as the "reckless
disregard of the rights of his employees" appears most appropri-
ate. 0 The goal is to ensure that employers are deterred from need-
lessly and recklessly injuring employees through thoughtless and
unnecessary acts. It does not put an undue burden on employers to
expect that they will carry out reasonable investigations in lieu of,
or at least prior to, resorting to a polygraph examination.
In a recent Practicing Law Institute seminar, the panelists, who
included corporate counsel to C.B.S. and Rockwell International,
advised against the use of polygraphs in employment. They urged
employers to use other more reliable and effective and less poten-
tially dangerous methods of ferreting out dishonesty in the
workplace."'
If an employer subjects his employee to a polygraph examination
without some reasonable basis for suspecting him of wrongdoing,
this may amount to an abuse of privilege.2
v. Stephens, 353 U.S. 949 (1957); De Ronde, 239 F.2d at 738 (defining malice as reckless
disregard or ill will); Andrews, 474 F. Supp. at 1282 (defining malice as reckless disregard, ill
will or conscious indifference); Bratt, 392 Mass. at -, 467 N.E.2d at 131-32 (defining mal-
ice as reckless disregard or as knowledge of falsity).
80. Failure to carry out a good faith investigation of employee misconduct may be evi-
dence of malice. See, e.g., Stephens, 240 F.2d at 767; Sumner Stores of Miss. v. Little, 187
Miss. 310, 192 So. 857 (1940); De Ronde, 239 F.2d at 738-45; Calero, 68 Wis. 2d at -, 228
N.W.2d at 749. Other courts have held that a failure to investigate is not sufficient to estab-
lish malice. See, e.g., Gaines v. CUNA Mut. Ins. Soc'y, 681 F.2d 982, 988 (5th Cir. 1982);
Boston Mut. Life Ins. v. Varone, 303 F.2d 155, 160 (1st Cir. 1962); Butler v. Central Bank &
Trust Co., 458 S.W.2d 510, 512 (Tex. Ct. App. 1970).
81. PRACTICING LAW INST., EMPLOYMENT PROBLEMS IN THE WORKPLACE (1986).
82. POLYGRAPHS AND EMPLOYMENT: THE MYTH OF LIE DETECTION, NEW YORK CIVIL LIBER-
TIES UNION PRIVACY PROJECT (1981).
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D. Invasion of Privacy
One of the major objections employees have to polygraph use is
that it involves an unwarranted intrusion into their private affairs.
This is especially true of pre-employment screening, where ques-
tions may cover a whole range of personal areas including political
beliefs, sexuality, financial security, family life, etc.8 3 However, as
courts are beginning to recognize, the use of polygraphs to investi-
gate particular misconduct at work also involves an invasion of an
employee's right to privacy. 4
The parameters of an employee's right.to privacy on the job are
only beginning to be developed. The central question is under
what circumstances an employee can be said to have a "reasonable
expectation of privacy. '8 5 Certainly, there is no privacy right that
would protect an employee from being interrogated about on-the-
job conduct. However, polygraph examinations routinely go be-
yond this narrow focus.
Before administering a polygraph examination, the operator typ-
ically asks the employee a series of questions about her physical
and mental health as well as about her use of drugs.86 Such infor-
mation is considered vital in determining the accuracy of the test
results. Asking an employee about her health and drug use, when it
does not relate to her performance on the job, certainly can be seen
as an unwarranted invasion of privacy.
83. Long Beach City Employees Ass'n v. City of Long Beach, 41 Cal. 3d 937, -, 719 P.2d
660, 666, 227 Cal. Rptr. 90, 96 (1986); Texas Dep't of Mental Health v. Texas State Employ-
ees Union, 708 S.W.2d 498 (Tx. Ct. App. 1986).
84. Texas State Employees Union, 708 S.W.2d at 509. Invasion of privacy may take dif-
ferent forms, each of which may give rise to an actionable tort:
1. Intrusion into plaintiff's private affairs.
2. Public disclosure of embarrassing private facts about plaintiff.
3. Publicity which casts plaintiff in a 'false light.'
4. Appropriation of plaintiff's name or identity for defendant's advantage.
See W. PROSSER & W. KEETON, supra note 47, § 117, at 849-69.
85. Id.
86. J. REID & F. INBAU, supra note 3, at 232-33; see Long Beach City Employees Ass'n, 41
Cal. 3d 937, 719 P.2d 660, 227 Cal. Rptr. 90 (where the City of Long Beach required employ-
ees to submit to polygraph testing as a part of its investigation of suspected theft by em-
ployees). In that case, the pre-test interview of each employee included the following
questions:
Ever been arrested for any reason? ...Any history of heart trouble or epilepsy?
• ..Under the care of a doctor now for any reason? ...Ever been treated by or
consulted a psychiatrist for any reason? Have you experimented with any type of
drugs-reds, whites, LSD, heroin or cocaine? ...Have you ever smoked marijuana
in your life? ...When was the last time?
Long Beach City Employees Ass'n, 41 Cal. 3d at -, 719 P.2d at 664, 227 Cal. Rptr. at 94.
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In addition, the "control" questions used in the administration
of the test often delve into private areas having nothing to do with
the employee's job performance. The employee may be asked
whether she has ever committed a dishonest act in her life. She
may be questioned about thefts or attempted thefts during
childhood. 7
According to polygraph examiners, use of control questions is
critical to the accurate interpretation of test results., As was de-
scribed in detail in the first section of this article, responses to con-
trol questions are compared to responses to relevant questions as
an aid in identifying the "guilty" subjects."9
In addition, an employee may not avoid a particularly intrusive
question by simply remaining silent 0 The polygraph will record
his emotional and physiological responses to an unsettling
question.
The question of the limits of an employee's right to privacy in
the context of employer use of polygraph testing is just beginning
to be litigated. It has come up primarily in the context of public
employees fighting discharges for refusing to submit to polygraph
examinations.9 1 Courts have found that employees do have privacy
rights, which may be founded in the state or federal constitution, a
state privacy statute or the common law.9 2 They have concluded
that polygraph examinations do infringe upon this right to privacy.
However, they go on to hold that the employee's right to privacy
must be balanced against the employer's need to conduct a reason-
87. J. REID & F. INBAU, supra note 3, at 28-30; see Long Beach City Employees Ass'n, 41
Cal. 3d at -, 719 P.2d at 665, 227 Cal. Rptr. at 95; see also Kamrath v. Suburban Nat'l
Bank, 363 N.W.2d 108, 110 (Minn. Ct. App. 1985) (polygraph testing can cause emotional
problems).
88. See J. REID & F. INBAU, supra note 3, at 28-30.
89. See supra text accompanying notes 1-8.
90. Long Beach City Employees Ass'n, 41 Cal. 3d at -, 719 P.2d at 665, 227 Cal. Rptr.
at 95.
91. PRACTICING LAW INST., supra note 81 at -.
Objections to polygraph testing have been raised by public employees in the past, primar-
ily on fifth amendment grounds, often without success. See, e.g., Roux v. New Orleans Po-
lice Dep't, 223 So. 2d 905, 910 (La. Ct. App.), cert. denied, 254 La. 815, 227 So. 2d 148
(1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 1008 (1970); Seattle Police Officers' Guild v. City of Seattle, 80
Wash. 2d 307, -, 494 P.2d 485, 493 (1972). But see Molino v. Board of Pub. Safety, 154
Conn. 368, -, 225 A.2d 805, 809 (1966).
92. PRACTICING LAW INST., supra note 81, at _. See also Cordle v. General Hugh Mercer
Corp., 325 S.E.2d 111, 117 (W. Va. 1984).
1987]
UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW
able investigation. Courts have reached different conclusions in ap-
plying this balancing test.
The Supreme Court of California recently recognized an em-
ployee right to privacy in the context of employer use of
polygraphs in Long Beach City Employees' Ass'n v. City of Long
Beach.9 3 The court addressed the difficulties posed by the use of
control questions, and the court came close to concluding that the
employee's right to privacy outweighed the value of the test to the
employer. However, as California has a statute prohibiting the use
of polygraphs in private employment, the court instead based its
decision on equal protection analysis. The court decided that al-
lowing public employees to be compelled to take such tests, when
private employees could not be so coerced, amounted to a denial of
equal protection. 4
In another recent case involving public employees, the Texas
Court of Appeals also recognized that polygraph testing involved
an invasion of an employee's right to privacy." The court specifi-
cally acknowledged the invasive nature of "control" questions.
However, the court was reluctant to conclude that polygraph test-
ing should never be permitted. The court found that the regula-
tions already in effect to protect employee's privacy were not suffi-
ciently stringent, and that additional safeguards were required.
The court concluded, therefore, that polygraph use should only be
permitted where serious misconduct was involved and where other
reasonable methods of investigation had been exhausted.
It remains to be seen whether a cause of action for invasion of
privacy will be recognized for employees injured by employer use
of polygraph testing. In related contexts, courts have been gener-
ally reluctant to recognize such a cause of action. 6 However, with
the recent controversy over drug testing in the workplace, it ap-
pears that courts will increasingly be called upon to set limits to
protect employee privacy."
93. 41 Cal. 3d at -, 719 P.2d at 663, 227 Cal. Rptr. at 93.
94. Id. at -, 719 P.2d at 671-72, 227 Cal. Rptr. at 101-02.
95. Texas State Employees Union, 708 S.W.2d at 510.
96. See, e.g., Cort v. Bristol-Myers Co., 385 Mass. 300, 431 N.E.2d 908 (1982) (employees
could be fired for refusing to complete a questionnaire which included personal questions
with no apparent relevance to job performance).
97. See, e.g., Capua v. City of Plainfield, 643 F. Supp. 1507 (D.N.J. 1986) (given the intru-
sive nature of the urinalysis test, it should only be administered where there exists a "rea-
sonable suspicion" of drug use by a specific employee).
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Where polygraph testing is involved, a strong argument can be
made that the invasion of an employee's privacy which is inherent
in the test, cannot be justified. The value of the test to the em-
ployer is limited by its unreliability and the number of false posi-
tives which are bound to occur. Alternative methods of investiga-
tion are available and are routinely used effectively in jurisdictions
where polygraph testing is prohibited.
IV. INTENTIONAL INFLICTION OF EMOTIONAL DISTRESS
To establish a cause of action for intentional infliction of emo-
tional distress, the employee must prove that his employer acted in
an outrageous manner, intentionally or recklessly inflicting severe
emotional distress on the employee.9 s
To date, in the absence of a statute prohibiting employer use of
polygraph testing, courts have refused to recognize a cause of ac-
tion for intentional infliction of emotional distress for employee
victims of polygraph testing."' They have held that firing an em-
ployee for refusing to take or failing a polygraph test is not outra-
geous conduct.
However, if the employee can establish that he was particularly
susceptible to emotional distress and his employer was aware of
this fact, he may have a cause of action.100 Furthermore, if the em-
98. W. PROSSER & W. KEETON, supra note 47, § 12.
99. American Road Serv. Co. v. Inmon, 394 So. 2d 361 (Ala. 1981); Food Fair Inc. v.
Anderson, 382 So. 2d 150, 153 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1980); Bridges v. Winn-Dixie Atlanta,
Inc., 176 Ga. App. 227, -, 335 S.E.2d 445, 448 (1985); Gibson v. Hummel, 688 S.W.2d 4, 8
(Mo. Ct. App. 1985); Todd v. South Carolina Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co., 283 S.C. 155, -,
321 S.E.2d 602, 612-13 (S.C. Ct. App. 1984), writ granted in part, 285 S.C. 84, 328 S.E.2d
479 (S.C.), decision quashed by, 287 S.C. 190, 336 S.E.2d 472 (S.C. 1985). But see Moniodis
v. Cook, 64 Md. App. 1, 494 A.2d 212, cert. denied, 304 Md. 631, 500 A.2d 649 (1985) (dam-
ages of over one million dollars awarded against employer who fired employees for refusing
to take polygraph examinations; employer's action violated state statute which provided
only for a fine not to exceed $100); Kamrath v. Suburban Nat'l Bank, 363 N.W.2d 108, 111
(Minn. Ct. App. 1985) (damages awarded for emotional distress stemming from employer's
violation of state statute forbidding employers from requesting employees to submit to poly-
graph testing).
100. Tandy Corp. v. Bone, 283 Ark. 399, 678 S.W.2d 312 (1984). In Tandy Corp., the
plaintiff was under investigation for involvement in theft. He was questioned for a full day
at thirty minute intervals, and was subjected to threats and harsh words by his interro-
gators. Near the end of the same day, when he was thoroughly upset and agitated by peri-
odic questioning, he was asked to take a polygraph test. He agreed, but requested permis-
sion to take his valium. His request was refused on the grounds that the valium might
interfere with the test results. The employee hyperventilated and was unable to proceed
with the test. He had been under a psychiatrist's care in the past, and this incident precipi-
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ployee can establish that the polygraph was administered primarily
to cause the employee emotional distress and force a confession, he
may also have a cause of action.101 This will be especially true in
circumstances where the employer or polygraph examiner threat-
ens the employee with arrest if he fails to cooperate where it is
clear that the evidence is insufficient to support such a step.
In general, it is difficult for employees to establish that their em-
ployer's actions have risen to the level of outrageous conduct. Yet
some courts have concluded that conduct which would not be con-
sidered outrageous between strangers could be considered outra-
geous in the context of an employer-employee relationship. 10 2
Also, employees will face a stiff burden in establishing that they
are suffering from severe emotional distress caused by their em-
ployer's actions. Employees would be well advised to be prepared
with expert medical opinions on both of these points.103
V. CONCLUSION
The traditional shields which have protected employers from lia-
bility for tortious conduct have no place where polygraph testing is
involved. Employers have no substantial or legitimate interest in
employing such an investigative tool of doubtful reliability, espe-
cially given the injury to employees which unavoidably accompa-
nies its use.
A bill prohibiting the use of polygraph examinations in private
employment passed the House of Representatives this Session. A
tated his return to the hospital. Under these circumstances, the court held there was suffi-
cient evidence to go to the jury on the question of intentional infliction of emotional
distress.
But see Bridges, 176 Ga. App. 227, 335 S.E.2d 445 (firing an employee who failed a poly-
graph examination did not amount to intentional infliction of emotional distress, even
though the employee was suffering from multiple sclerosis at the time she took the test).
101. See Hall v. May Dep't Stores, Co., 292 Or. 131, 637 P.2d 126 (1981). In Hall, the
Oregon Supreme Court upheld plaintiff's jury verdict, finding that there was evidence to
support a cause of action for intentional infliction of emotional distress. The plaintiff had
alleged that the defendants intentionally caused her severe emotional distress by threaten-
ing her with prosecution, in an effort to force a confession. But see Food Fair, 382 So. 2d
150 (employee who had been pressed into a false admission of theft by a polygraph operator
did not have a cause of action for intentional infliction of emotional distress but did have a
cause of action against the polygraph operator for fraud and deceit).
102. See generally Annotation, Liability of Employer, Supervisor, or Manager for Inten-
tionally or Recklessly Causing Employee Emotional Distress, 86 A.L.R.3D 454 (1978).
103. See, e.g., Jones v. Harris, 35 Md. App. 556, 371 A.2d 1104, aff'd, Harris v. Jones, 281
Md. 560. 380 A.2d 611 (1977).
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similar bill was considered by the Senate Committee on Labor and
Industry, but its consideration by the full Senate was prevented by
a filibuster by supporters of the polygraph. National legislation
prohibiting polygraph use and providing meaningful compensation
to those injured by violation of such legislation would be a wel-
come response to the concerns raised in this article. Unfortunately,
the likelihood of the passage of such legislation is uncertain due to
the existence of a strong polygraph lobby.
Employees who are being injured now by polygraph testing need
not wait for the passage of national legislation to seek protection
by the courts. Common law remedies exist which can and should
be utilized. Individuals do not give up all rights to be protected
from tortious injury by accepting employment. If employers choose
to continue to use polygraph testing, they must be prepared to
compensate innocent employees who are injured as a result.

